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REGIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE: THE
ROLE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
KRISTEN M. FLETCHER†
I. INTRODUCTION
In the two years since the Pew Ocean Commission and U.S.
Ocean Commission recommendations, policymakers and ocean managers have begun considering regional ocean governance (“ROG”) as
a tool to better manage ocean and coastal resources and move toward
ecosystem-based management of the oceans and coasts. A ROG
mechanism would not start from scratch; to the contrary, regional (or
in some circumstances “multi-state”) efforts have existed for decades.
The elevation of ROG to the position of a structural foundation for
state, regional, and national marine resource management requires
consideration of the historical underpinnings of ocean and coastal
management, namely the Public Trust Doctrine (“PTD” or “Doctrine”) and its role in moving governance structures toward effective
ecosystem-based management.
The PTD is relevant not only in the establishment of ROG, but
also in its implementation. This article presents background and
emerging questions for the role of the PTD, at state, regional, and national landscapes. First, from the state perspective, the PTD is an existing tool for management of marine public trust resources. Does the
existence of the Doctrine negate the need for a state to participate in
ROG and, if not, will conflicts that exist between states in their application of the Doctrine affect ROG? Second, from the regional perspective, does ROG create an underlying public trust responsibility
on a regional level through an interest based on conservation or on
use? Third, from a national perspective, given the emergence of ROG

† Director, Marine Affairs Institute and Rhode Island Sea Grant Legal Program, Roger
Williams University. Special thanks to Ingrid Nugent, Mark Hill, and Sarah Doverspike who
thoughtfully organized the Regional Ocean Governance Symposium in 2005 and this journal
issue. This article is based on a talk given at Duke Law School in October 2005 and is dedicated
to Professor Conrad Kellenberg who celebrated 50 years of teaching in 2005, including three
inspiring years during which he was instrumental in the professional and personal development
of the author. Cheers, Professor, and thanks for reminding me why I became a lawyer.
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and the inherent role of states, will the Doctrine evolve into a multijurisdictional approach for the furtherance of ecosystem-based management? This article addresses these elements from the perspective
of the Northeast region,1 within the context of two ROG related
events in 2005: the establishment of the Northeast Regional Ocean
Council and the ocean governance resolutions adopted by leaders in
the region.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF OCEAN GOVERNANCE
A. The Public Trust Doctrine in its Historical Context
At the state level, uses and management of marine resources
2
have evolved within the context of the PTD, the origins of which date
3
to the Roman Empire. The Doctrine provides that public trust lands,
waters, and living resources are held by a state in trust for benefit of
its people, and that they may use these resources for navigation, fishing, commerce, and (in more recent years) recreation.4
The original Roman Public Trust principles influenced the laws
of the English, Spanish, French, and Dutch, and their respective colonies. In the United States, the original thirteen colonies, and states
that joined the United States following the American Revolution, followed the English common law as to sovereign ownership of tidelands
with some variation. Under the constitutional principle of the Equal
Footing Doctrine, state ownership of tidelands was extended to all

1. Depending on which definition of “region” is used, some view the Northeast (typically
thought of as New York to Maine) as a subregion of the larger Northeastern Continental Shelf
Ecosystem. See BILIANA CICIN-SAIN, WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS OF IMPROVING REGIONAL
OCEAN GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES, AN OVERVIEW OF POLICY ISSUES AND
OPTIONS FOR IMPROVED REGIONAL OCEAN GOVERNANCE 4 (Dec. 9, 2002), available at
http://www.udel.edu/CMS/csmp/pdf/RegionalProceedings.pdf (citing Ken Sherman, Sustainability, Biomass Yields, and Health of Coastal Ecosystems: An Ecological Perspective, 112 MARINE
ECOLOGY PROGRESS SERIES 277, 277-301 (1994).
2. For purposes of this article, the discussion of the PTD is limited to the scope of discussion of ROG. A wealth of background and critical analysis exists in legal journals, including Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention,
68 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1970); Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine From Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185 (1980); Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the
Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L.
425 (1989); and Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q.
351 (1998).
3. DAVID C. SLADE, R. KERRY KEHOE & JANE K. STAHL, PUTTING THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE TO WORK 15 (2d ed. 1997).
4. Id. at 3.
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new states.5 In its sovereign capacity, each state has defined the PTD
through its courts and legislatures depending on societal needs
through the decades.
As a result, the Doctrine differs state by state and may still be
6
dynamic in its application. In the 1894 case of Shively v. Bowlby, the
U.S. Supreme Court stated that:
[T]here is no universal and uniform law upon the subject, but that
each State has dealt with the lands under the tidewaters within its
borders according to its own views of justice and policy, reserving
its own control over such lands, or granting rights therein to individuals or corporations, whether owners of the adjoining upland or
7
not, as it considered for the best interests of the public.

Furthermore, the Court noted that “[g]reat caution . . . is necessary in
8
applying precedents in one State to cases arising in another.”
9
The case of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi evidences the
dynamic nature of the Doctrine given that a potential tideland leaseholder and the state disputed its application to submerged lands af10
fected by the tide but were not navigable in fact. The U.S. Supreme
Court again clarified the independent nature of the Doctrine by relying on precedent that “it has long been established that the individual
States have the authority to define the limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as they see fit.”11
Ultimately, Mississippi won its claim of title to the tidally influenced
submerged lands even though the lands were not navigable in fact
and Mississippi had collected property taxes for decades from private
owners of those lands.12
The public’s rights to public trust resources vary by state but are
based on the Doctrine’s original three rights of fishing, navigation,13

5. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 222, 228-29 (1845) (finding that the new U.S. states
joined the Union on an equal footing with the original thirteen states).
6. 152 U.S. 1 (1894).
7. Id. at 26.
8. Id.
9. 484 U.S. 469 (1988).
10. Id. at 472.
11. Id. at 475 (citing Shively, 152 U.S. at 26).
12. Id. at 490. For a full account of the Phillips Petroleum Co. decision and its aftermath in
Mississippi, see John A. Duff & Kristen M. Fletcher, Augmenting the Public Trust: The Secretary
of State’s Efforts to Create a Public Trust Ecosystem Regime in Mississippi, 67 MISS. L.J. 645
(1998).
13. However, “navigation” can vary between states; see Adams v. Pease, 2 Conn. 481, 483
(1818); Cobb v. Davenport, 32 N.J.L. 369, 378 (1867); West v. Slick, 326 S.E. 2d 601, 617 (N.C.
1985).
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and commerce. In many states, the public’s use of the waterways has
evolved into an additional public trust right of recreation14 and modern uses that are “related to the natural uses peculiar to that re15
source.” In determining public access to California tidelands, the
Supreme Court of California noted:
[a] growing public recognition that one of the most important public uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed within the tidelands
trust—is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so
that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open
space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for
birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and
16
climate of the area.

Despite these differences in interpretation or application, the
alienation of trust resources is subject to a standard established in the
17
case of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois in which the United States
Supreme Court found that the state of Illinois had abdicated its responsibility to preserve the waters for the use of the public by ceding
control of a harbor to a private interest.18 Case law throughout the nation has followed Illinois Central, firmly establishing that a sale of
public trust lands must be clear and unequivocal, serve a public purpose, and not substantially impair trust resources and their use.19
At the state level, the PTD is often the oldest submerged lands
authority and it has been codified by many states and included in
their Constitutions.20 Thus, while the Doctrine is applied differently
state by state, it is consistently an integral part of ocean and coastal
management for balancing uses, conserving living marine resources,
and managing the shoreline.

14. The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that the traditional public rights included the right
to bathe. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 414 (1842). Additionally, recreational activities have been deemed to include “whatever is needed for the complete and innocent enjoyment” of trust lands. Tr. of the Freeholders & Commonalty of Brookhaven v. Smith, 80 N.E.
665, 670 (N.Y. 1907).
15. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, supra note 2, at 477.
16. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
17. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
18. Id. at 453.
19. Id. at 452-53. See also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Super. Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 721-22 (Cal.
1983); Nedtweg v. Wallace, 208 N.W. 51, 55 (Mich. 1926).
20. E.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 27; FLA. CONST. art. X, § 11; HAW. CONST. art. XII, § 4; ALA.
CONST. art. I, § 24; MINN. CONST. art. II, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. 14, §§ 1, 4; WIS. CONST. art. IX, §
1.
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B. The Progression of Regional Ocean Governance
While the PTD provides a mechanism to manage ocean and
coastal resources within a state’s jurisdiction, the challenge of interjurisdictional management remains. Political boundaries, often delineated without attention to ecosystems, create inherent hurdles for
natural resource management. Not surprisingly, this fact was noted by
two recent documents related to U.S. ocean policy. America’s Living
Oceans, a report by the Pew Ocean Commission, stated that “[n]ot a
system at all, U.S. ocean policy is a hodgepodge of individual laws
that has grown by accretion over the years, often in response to crisis.”21 Similarly, the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy, in its report
entitled An Ocean Blueprint for the 21st Century, noted that to “move
toward an ecosystem-based management approach, government
should have the institutional capacity to respond to ocean and coastal
issues in a coordinated fashion across jurisdictional boundaries.”22
To solve this jurisdictional dilemma, the U.S. Commission on
Ocean Policy proposed the “voluntary establishment of regional
ocean councils, developed through a process supported by the National Ocean Council, [that] would facilitate the development of regional goals and priorities and improve responses to regional issues.”23
The Commission believed that the “development and dissemination
of regionally significant research and information is imperative to
meet the information needs of managers and support ecosystem24
based decisions.” In response, the President’s Ocean Action Plan
supported the creation of regional collaborations on oceans, coasts,
and Great Lakes policy in partnership with states, local governments,
and tribes.25 Specifically, the Plan calls for additional regional collaboration in the Great Lakes and Gulf of Mexico.26
Following the issuance of the Ocean Action Plan, with federal
encouragement on several levels, Rhode Island Governor Donald L.
Carcieri proposed the creation of the Northeast Regional Ocean
21. PEW OCEANS COMM’N, AMERICA’S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR SEA
CHANGE 26 (2003), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/pdf/env_pew_oceans_final_report.pdf.
22. U.S. COMM’N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY:
FINAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY 86 (2004), available at
http://www.oceancommission.gov/documents/full_color_ rpt/000_ocean_full_report.pdf.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, U.S. OCEAN ACTION PLAN: THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE TO THE U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY 10-11 (2004),
available at http://ocean.ceq.gov/actionplan.pdf [hereinafter U.S. OCEAN ACTION PLAN].
26. Id.
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Council (“NROC”) comprised of stakeholders appointed by the governors of each state.27 Governor Carcieri contacted the governors of
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont
noting that “the Northeast region has a significant opportunity to endorse and implement this recommendation [to create a regional
28
ocean information system] by enhancing our regional cooperation.”
According to Governor Carcieri, the New England states should create the NROC to facilitate the development of more coordinated and
collaborative regional goals and priorities and to improve responses
to regional issues.29
Governor Carcieri is also the Chair of the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premieres Conference, a conference of
leaders from Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Vermont,
New Hampshire, Maine, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Quebec,
Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland & Labrador that addresses
“issues of common interest and concern, and enact[s] policy resolutions that call on actions by the state and provincial governments, as
30
well as by the two national governments.” At its 2005 meeting, the
conference adopted several resolutions indicating priorities for the
conference during Governor Carcieri’s two-year term as Chair. The
Resolutions were Resolution 29-1 on the Security and Prosperity
Partnership of North America, Resolution 29-2 on Energy, Resolution 29-3 on the Oceans, and Resolution 29-4 on the Environment.31
The Resolution Concerning Oceans created an Oceans Working
Committee to:
foster international cooperation and collaboration on all aspects of
marine and ocean related research and development[,] . . . facilitate
the exchange of information[,] . . . seek partnerships and synergies
to facilitate existing initiatives such as the Gulf of Maine Council on
the Marine Environment and encourage new initiatives and partnerships[,] . . . address related environmental issues[,] . . . and pro-

27. Testimony of Governor Donald L. Carcieri to the Comm. on Ocean Policy (Apr. 5,
2005) (on file with author).
28. E.g., Letter from Governor Donald L. Carcieri to Governor M. Jodi Rell (Apr. 4, 2005)
(on file with author).
29. Id.
30. More information on the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premieres is available at http://www.negc.org/premiers.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
31. Resolutions of the New England Governors Conference are available at
http://www.negc.org/documents/Resolutions.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
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vide a vehicle for cooperation on all aspects of ocean manage32
ment.

Also, the committee was tasked to make recommendations to the
Governors and Premieres “on all practical means to expand and en33
hance regional efforts on all ocean related issues.”
It is likely more than coincidence that priority issues discussed
for ROG include several of the priority issues included in the remain34
ing resolutions, especially environmental and energy concerns. In
the Resolution on Energy, the leaders called for information and
analysis from committees regarding regional fuel and supply diversity,
assessment of undeveloped natural gas resources in the region, energy
conservation and efficiency initiatives, and an ongoing discussion between industry and government on challenges and opportunities for
the natural gas and related energy sectors.35 The Resolution on the
Environment called for strategies regarding transport issues, mercury
reduction, acid rain and air pollution sources, greenhouse gas emissions, and ecosystem-based management approaches.36
While these resolutions indicate priority areas for ROG consideration, the resolutions are only as strong as the Governors and Premieres that seek to implement them. On a national scale, discussion
regarding implementation of ROG has differed from region to region.
Most discussion has focused on the mechanism(s) for ROG and has
defined the regions and appropriate issues that should be addressed
37
by each region. However, managers and policymakers consistently

32. Resolution 29-3, Resolution Concerning Oceans (Aug. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.negc.org/documents/Resolutions.pdf.
33. Id.
34. For a sample of leading issues for regional concern, see CICIN-SAIN, supra note 1, at 7.
The concerns listed include fishing habitats and stocks, conflicts between protected marine
mammals, marine transportation, land development patterns, and implications of development
of new uses of the Exclusive Economic Zone (“EEZ”), such as offshore aquaculture and wind
farming. See also INTEGRATED COASTAL MANAGEMENT, UNCED AGENDA 21 ch. 17.3 (1992),
available at http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21 chapter17.htm
(defining the EEZ as “an important marine area where the States manage the development and
conservation of natural resources for the benefit of their people”).
35. Resolution 29-2, Resolution Concerning Energy (Aug. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.negc.org/documents/Resolutions.pdf.
36. Resolution 29-4, Resolution on the Environment (Aug. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.negc.org/documents/Resolutions.pdf.
37. See KIM ENGIE, AN OVERVIEW OF REGIONAL COORDINATION IN THE GREAT LAKES,
GULF OF MAINE, AND CHESAPEAKE BAY (2004) available at http://courses.washington.edu/
oceangov/reference_mtls/USRegOview.pdf.
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state that ROG must be part of the solution rather than a “solution
looking for a problem.”38
C. Functional Regional Governance: Litigation and Compacts
A regional governance system may offer a variety of functions
such as providing coordination and management between states, serving as an information sharing mechanism, or supplying a decisionmaking structure. The New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premieres is a hybrid mechanism; it has only a few obligations
attached, and its most common function has been information sharing
39
with some management-related activities, depending upon the issue.
However, other formal and informal efforts exist, offering lessons for
ROG efforts in New England.
Northeastern states (and in some cases, states from other regions) have joined forces to coordinate multi-party litigation, including the tobacco litigation begun in 1994 that led to a national effort by
40
more than forty states to sue tobacco companies. More recently, a
lawsuit began by eight states to fight CO2 emissions as a pollutant,
shows that the environment and public health are rising “to the fore41
front as a cause for the Attorneys General.” Columbia Law School
held a symposium entitled “The Role of State Attorneys General in
National Environmental Policy” in 2004, and the comments of the Attorneys General are instructive lessons for regional efforts, whether
based on a short-term, single issue, or a long-term suite of problems.
The number of states involved in any effort defines the lawsuit.
More coordination is needed as the number of involved states increases. In addition, the more states, the more resources that will be

38. John H. Dunnigan, Nat’l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin. Ecosystem Goal Team, Lecture at the Coastal Zone Conference (July 20, 2005).
39. The Council of Atlantic Premieres describes the relationship of the Conference of New
England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers as “a unique and highly effective international relationship of states and provinces sharing ideas and building on historic ties. The Conference advances the interests of the eleven jurisdictions through cooperation and encourages
collaboration with the private sector.” See http://www.cap-cpma.ca/default.asp?mn=1.62.4.28
(last visited Jan. 5, 2006).
40. For analysis of the tobacco litigation, see Wendy E. Parmet, Tobacco, HIV and the
Courtroom: The Role of Affirmative Litigation in the Formation of Public Health Policy, 36
HOUS. L. REV. 1663 (1999); Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal,
Economic, and Political Legacy of the Governments’ Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143
(2001).
41. The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmental Policy: Welcome &
Global Warming Panel, Part I, 30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 335, 347 (2005) (statement of Richard
Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut).
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available. The importance of the number and characteristics of states
in lawsuits is especially evident in CO2 lawsuits with larger states such
42
as New York and California as parties. As more states commit to the
effort, it will become increasingly clear to the public, private sector,
and federal government that it is an issue worthy of significant attention and dedication of resources.
Another concern in litigation is the ability to sue in one court
rather than several courts. In explaining the relative benefit of the
CO2 litigation, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General of Connecticut, noted:
We’re also lucky because we’re in one court. . . . For tobacco, we
were in 50 different states, 50 different courts, so we had to make
sure one state wasn’t saying something that would hurt another
state, so here the coordination problem is better. Iowa demonstrates the stake of the Midwest in this problem and shows that
there’s not just one coast, but a national problem. So there are ways
43
that additional states can help in this problem.

One reality of multi-state efforts is that benefits might not always be
easily shown. Often, more subtle benefits are overlooked. Tom
Miller, Attorney General of Iowa, noted that “the underlying point is
that trying to do the right thing, and trying to do it together and sup44
port each other, is a wonderful intangible [benefit].” Blumenthal explains that the rationale for any multi-party effort may not be clear
from the beginning; rather, it may begin as an instinct:
And in a way, this lawsuit began with a lump in the throat, a gut
feeling, emotion, that CO2 pollution and global warming were
problems that needed to be addressed. They were urgent and immediate and needed some kind of action, and it wasn’t coming from
the federal government. And it also began with a lump in the
throat. David Hawkins and I were sitting having bagels, brainstorming about what could be done. This was 3 1/2 years ago, and
we agreed that we would each think, explore, [and] research about
45
it.

While individual states or a regional council may develop a checklist
of qualities concerning issues to be addressed regionally, in the end,
the council may be most effective when the leaders share an instinct
that the problem must be addressed collectively.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 346 (statement of Richard Blumenthal).
Id.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 339.
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Interstate compacts represent a more formal approach for states
to join together on common issues and have served a major role in
46
governing natural resources. The basis for negotiating interstate
compacts is found in the U.S. Constitution, which states that “no state
shall, without the consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or
47
compact with another state or with a foreign power.” This compact
clause implicitly recognizes state power to negotiate and enter into
agreements subject to congressional consent. Formation of an interstate compact typically has three stages: (1) Congress authorizes negotiation of the compact, usually with a federal representative as part
of the negotiations, (2) states enter into compact negotiations, and (3)
Congress consents to the negotiated compact.48
The resulting interstate compact is a legal instrument that binds
states to formal cooperation. There is no limit to the number of states
which may be involved in an interstate compact. Interstate compacts
are useful in that they can address regional problems of concern to
particular states which are transboundary but too localized to be a national issue. A key example is the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
49
Compact.
In 1942, Congress approved an interstate compact and created
the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (“ASMFC”), which
served as an advisory board with the power to make legislative recommendations regarding common fish species in the state waters of
15 coastal Atlantic States.50 In 1993, Congress enacted the Atlantic

46. For more information on interstate compacts for natural resource management, see Jill
Elaine Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49
FLA. L. REV. 1 (1997); Jeffrey Uhlman Beaverstock, Learning to Get Along: Alabama, Georgia,
Florida and the Chattahoochee River Compact, 49 ALA. L. REV. 993 (1998); Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in the Southeastern States at the Opening of the 21st Century,
25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9 (2002); Jonathan I. Charney, The Delimitation of Lateral
Seaward Boundaries Between States in a Domestic Context, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 28 (1981);
Marlissa S. Briggett, State Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The Interstate Compact, 18 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 751 (1991).
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
48. See FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF
INTERSTATE COMPACTS 25 (1976), available at http://www.csg.org/NR/rdonlyres/edgtwasgvq
22amg5ba3zsqreagu4cjodzjidnhzfy45t3l6j3tg6xlpief7tm2ktxj4cu7ydmm2h4tuwm7gn5ka74dd/Th
e+Law+and+Use+of+Interstate+Compacts%3B+Zimmermann+&+Wendell%3B+CSG,+1976.
pdf.
49. 77 Pub. L. 539, 56 Stat. 267 (1942) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101 - 5108 (2000)).
50. The states are: Florida (Atlantic coast only), Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina,
Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine. Elizabeth C. Scott, Managing the Maine Lobster Fishery: An Evaluation of Alternatives, 20 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 573, 583 (2001).
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Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act expanding the
Commission’s authority to include the creation of coastal manage51
ment plans and findings of state noncompliance. The Atlantic States
were to use the ASMFC as a vehicle for joint management of important coastal fisheries with other member states, rather than continuing
52
to promulgate varying state-by-state regulations.
The Commission views the rebound of the striped bass population as one of its greatest successes but notes that the success was
53
based on common values implemented among the member states.
These values include respect of state sovereignty, transparency in
programs and actions, and flexibility within conservation parameters.54 The rationale for member states is to provide collective, cooperative management and to make decisions that are “good for all ver55
sus best for one.” With fifteen member states, members can pool
their scientific resources and, in some cases, streamline data collection. Ultimately, the Commission hopes to provide states with incentives to act but has access to action forcing mechanisms.56
The benefits of an interstate compact include greater efficiency
than a federal regulatory response because states in a region are generally more familiar with a problem and can be more responsive to
57
local and regional needs. Unlike informal interstate cooperation, a
compact is binding to the citizens of the member states and provides a
formal mechanism for states to reduce jurisdictional hurdles associated with transboundary problems.58 The process of political adjustment required to negotiate a compact allows the parties to specify decisionmaking procedures and standards.
However, in reality, states may not always cooperate intensively
or continuously. For political purposes, states’ chief executives may
insist upon negotiation between Governors, resulting in intermittent
progress. A lack of intensive cooperation may lead to protracted negotiation and disagreement, exacerbating delay. Rather than repre-

51. 16 U.S.C. § 5101.
52. Scott, supra note 48, at 583-84.
53. Statement of Vince O’Shea, Executive Dir., Atl. States Marine Fisheries Comm’n (Jan.
13, 2006) (on file with author).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Stephen David Galowitz, Interstate Metro-Regional Responses to Exclusionary Zoning,
27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 49, 118-23 (1992).
58. Id. at 45.
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senting the interests of the region, members of these interstate bodies
typically represent the interests of their respective jurisdictions.
Finally, states may not unilaterally amend the compact without
the consent of all signatory states.59 While this is a sign of respect for
sovereignty (noted above as a strength in the context of the ASMFC),
it also may cause delays and makes adaptive management a challenge.
Even with action forcing mechanisms at the disposal of the
ASMFC, consensus is the key mechanism of action. Voting rules notwithstanding, many commissions have often found it necessary to
proceed by consensus. This suggests that “political considerations
cannot be sidestepped by granting a regional organization more formal authority[;] . . . decisions are going to be made by a process of negotiation and consent-building, not by the fiat of a regional agency.”60
Perhaps because of the political costs to create and maintain them
and their mixed record of success, “very few of [the recently emerging
organizational arrangements for watersheds] have sought to transfer
powers and authorities from existing agencies to a watershed authority” and have focused instead on less formal collaborative institutions.61
A final notable challenge to the creation of a compact appears at
the legislative level. Interstate compacts require agreement by all
state legislatures. Each legislature must adopt necessary legislation to
become a member state and may need to amend existing laws to do
62
so. In the context of ROG, state leaders will need to account for conflicts of laws that might prevent the state from becoming part of a larger body or participating fully in a body that specifically addresses
ocean issues.
With these lessons in mind, federal structures also provide similar guidance for the advancement of transboundary management.
One commentator notes that the affirmative stewardship responsibil-

59. Id. at 46.
60. Jon Cannon, Choices and Institutions in Watershed Management, 25 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 379, 392 (2000) (citing Helen M. Ingram, The Political Economy of
Regional Watershed Institutions, 55 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 10, 17 (1973)).
61. Id. at 392 (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NEW STRATEGIES FOR AMERICA’S
WATERSHEDS 186 (1999)).
62. For a review of the role of federal and state consent in interstate compacts, see Marlissa
S. Briggett, State Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The Interstate Compact, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REV. 751, 757-67 (1991). For a review of challenges of interstate compacts, see Jill Elaine
Hasday, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of Permanency, 49 FLA. L.
REV. 1 (1997).
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ity for managers of the National Wildlife Refuge System “provides a
statutory basis for application of the Public Trust Doctrine.”63 Thus,
the presence of an affirmative stewardship duty may “finally generate
a body of public trust case law and practices for the federal public
lands”64 and serve “as a basis for the [Fish and Wildlife] Service to defend more assertive protection of the refuges, especially when dealing
65
with external threats.” This attempt to address pressures from outside the refuges’ boundaries represents a federal approach to regional
management and reaffirms the role of the PTD and incentives for the
states to act as resource trustees.
III. THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
In considering ROG, the role of the PTD is often overlooked.
Indeed, the Doctrine itself may be overlooked as a tool for transboundary resource management. With its historic and current role in
marine resource management, its codification into state law, and its
flexibility in implementation, the PTD can act as a vehicle to advance
ROG rather than as a hindrance. Even though it is applied differently
from state to state, the fundamental elements of the Doctrine can tie
the efforts of each state together.
Of course, the PTD has its critics, including those that posit the
Doctrine is out of step with modern environmental laws that seek to
allow adaptive management for resources or as a tool used to avoid
making difficult political decisions.66 While some critics point to its
67
basis in property law and trust management as limiting, it is this trust
relationship that allows for transboundary management of trust lands
and waters. The role of the state as a trustee over resources should
not be undervalued, especially in the context of multi-state efforts to
manage or conserve marine resources.
A key to understanding the role of the Doctrine in ROG is that
“it is the nature of this specific land, not who manages the land, which
63. See Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and the Hallmarks of
Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457, 581 (2002).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 582.
66. See Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in Natural
Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 687-90 (1986); James L.
Huffman, A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19
ENVTL. L. 527, 556 (1989); James L. Huffman, Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the Public Trust Writings of Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson, 63
DENV. U. L. REV. 565, 582-84 (1986).
67. See Rose, supra note 2, at 356.
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makes it subject to the Public Trust.”68 Thus, the similarities between
the states’ public trust resources are more significant than the subtle
(and sometimes not so subtle) differences between state doctrines.
The fact that states have codified the PTD in their constitutions
and statutes is evidenced by the role it has in marine resource management, especially concerning the harvest of living marine resources,
as well as in evolving public interest in enjoying the coasts. The
Rhode Island Constitution provides that people of the state “shall
continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of the fishery, and
privileges of the shore, to which they have been heretofore entitled
69
under the charter and usages of the state.” The Constitution provides that privileges of the shore include “fishing from the shore, the
gathering of seaweed, leaving the shore to swim in the sea, and passage along the shore.”70 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has
codified public trust principles in Chapter 91 authorizing the Department of Environmental Protection to protect the public interest in
“tidelands, Great Ponds, and non-tidal rivers and streams in accordance with the PTD as established by common law and codified in the
Colonial Ordinances of 1641-47 and subsequent statutes and case law
of Massachusetts.”71
These codifications show the inherently common nature of resources, and though they may differ in specific language or prioritization of uses, the fundamental rationale for their protection is the
same. In the context of interstate resource use and protection, states
have the right to protect their natural resources, even in the face of
72
discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. In Maine v. Taylor, a
case in which “[o]nce again, a little fish has caused a commotion,”73
the Supreme Court held that the state “retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the integrity
of its natural resources” as long as the methods do not represent “an
arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce” or could not
adequately be served by nondiscriminatory alternatives.74 This deci-

68. See Kelly McGrath, The Feasibility of Using Zoning to Reduce Conflicts in the Exclusive
Economic Zone, 11 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 183, 191 (2004).
69. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 17.
70. Id.
71. 310 MASS. CODE REGS. 9.01(2)(a) (1987).
72. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
73. Id. at 132.
74. Id. at 151 (holding that states retain broad regulatory authority to protect the health
and safety of citizens and the integrity of natural resources).
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sion bolstered the security of the PTD as a tool for states to protect
resources and citizens’ rights to use those resources.
Though this decision clarifies the use of the Doctrine in the context of out-of-state use of a trust resource, a remaining challenge to
the PTD as a basis for ROG is the application of the Doctrine for
competing in-state interests. Many of the PTD’s protected uses conflict, and the Doctrine “creates no specific hierarchy in the uses.”75
Thus, state legislatures and agencies must balance the suitability of
76
uses to the marine environment. Courts have begun to weigh in on
this undeveloped aspect of the Doctrine. In Weden v. San Juan
77
County, the Washington Supreme Court determined that a county
ordinance prohibiting navigation and recreational use by personal watercraft is consistent with the state’s PTD because “it would be an odd
use of the PTD to sanction an activity that actually harms and damages the waters and wildlife of this state.”78
Other courts have begun to see the evolution of the PTD from a
use doctrine to one that includes resource protection. In the 1983 case
79
of National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court applied the PTD to the appropriation of water, finding
80
that a two-step public trust review was warranted. First, the court
called for “a ‘responsible body’ [to] balance the appropriator’s needs
with the watershed’s needs to determine whether ‘the benefit gained
is worth the price.’”81 Second, the court called for this body to determine “whether some lesser taking would better balance the diverse
82
interests.”
Prior to National Audubon Society, courts had not applied the
83
PTD in this way. Thus, the decision “potentially allowed the state to
reallocate water from private consumptive uses to public instream
uses.”84 While the decision did not yield subsequent PTD pronounce-

75. Donna R. Christie, Marine Reserves, the Public Trust Doctrine and Intergenerational
Equity, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 427, 432 (2004).
76. Id.
77. 958 P.2d 273 (Wash. 1998).
78. Id. at 284.
79. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
80. See id. at 728.
81. Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near-Text and Context, 27 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1155, 1162 (1995) (citing Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 728).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1155.
84. Id.
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ments,85 the California State Water Resources Control Board “has
begun to articulate the trust’s meaning and its legal place in the western water allocation system . . . [culminating] in two recent State Water Board decisions that have finally fulfilled National Audubon Society’s promise to reallocate water from existing appropriations to
86
public trust-protected uses.” These decisions reallocated water, both
among trust uses and between trust and consumptive uses, based on
the PTD.
National Audubon Society shows the use of the PTD in complex
natural resource management decisions, especially those addressing
shared or migratory resources such as freshwater. In the context of
multi-jurisdictional issues, water as a shared resource is especially instructive. In arguing the common property status of the waters of the
Great Lakes Basin, one commentator noted that because water is a
resource:
It would seem, then, that the riparian doctrine’s reasonable use requirement and the public trust doctrine both place significant limitations on the use of the Great Lakes and their tributary waters. . . .
If one treats the public resource under such a public trust-type doctrine, it would presuppose an existing servitude on the resource and
87
would not allow for private taking.

The public trust guiding principles are woven into the Final Report to the Governments of Canada and the United States issued by
88
the International Joint Commission in 2000, which balances domestic and foreign extractive uses based on doctrines of sustainable development, equitable use, public trust, and unilateral declaration. The
Great Lakes example shows that states have not only the right, but
also the duty, to regulate resource consumption, including trust resources, with the effects on current and future generations in mind.89
The water management decisions in California and the Great
Lakes Basin show that working on a regional scale can actually assist
Northeastern states in meeting their PTD responsibility. The ASMFC

85. Weber notes that “[f]or the first dozen years after its announcement, the decision had
not spawned a single reallocation of water from a consumptive to an instream use. In short, the
Doctrine’s promise remained largely inchoate and its message largely inarticulate.” Id. at 1156.
86. Id. at 1156-57.
87. Leticia M. Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner, The Necessity of Preventing Unilateral Responses to Water Scarcity – The Next Major Threat against Mankind this Century, 9 CARDOZO J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 38 (2001).
88. INT’L JOINT COMM’N, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES, FINAL
REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (2000).
89. Diaz & Dubner, supra note 82, at 39.
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is also instructive: Considering that fishing is one of the Doctrine’s
original three protected uses, it is easy to see the connection between
the Northeastern states PTD responsibilities and their agreement to
manage shared resources through the ASMFC. A principle goal of
the ASMFC is to provide better coordination between states for con90
servation of shared stocks. Underlying this rationale is the fact that
citizens of each state have the right to fish and will harvest marine resources. A body such as the ASMFC works to advance PTD responsibilities and principles.
Multi-state litigation also provides a basis for viewing the PTD as
an advancement of regional governance principles. Even without a
formal mechanism, multi-state litigation is based on the states’ police
powers (those responsibilities that are inherent in a state to meet the
needs of its citizens). In the two examples given above, public health
served as the incentive for multi-state litigation. Given the nature of
Long Island Sound, the Gulf of Maine, or the air-shed above the public waters of the Northeast, the health of these shared public resources can serve as motivation for seeking a multi-state solution to a
damaging actor or factor.
From the perspective of the emerging NROC, the PTD remains a
shared principle for the states to rely upon, providing common linkages of public access, management, and conservation of marine resources. At the August 2005 meeting, the New England Governors
and Eastern Canadian Premieres prioritized energy defense and ecosystem management for a regional approach.91 Add to this the more
specific problems such as energy facility siting, water quality, or management of transboundary living resources, and the PTD serves as an
important tool in the suite of state and federal statutory and common
law principles to advance a regional approach to marine resource
management.
IV. CONCLUSION
A primary challenge for the NROC or any ROG effort in the
United States is finding incentives, either in the shape of an action
forcing mechanism such as the ASMFC or long-term shared problems
and negotiated solutions as seen in the Great Lakes. To move toward
ecosystem-based management, a multi-jurisdictional effort is essen-

90. 77 Pub. L. 539, 56 Stat. 267; 16 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5108 (2000).
91. Resolution 29-2, Resolution Concerning Energy (Aug. 29, 2005), available at
http://www.negc.org/documents/Resolutions.pdf.
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tial, but the incentives to expend the resources to work in a regional
fashion are still vague.
The PTD not only provides states with a mechanism to manage
marine resources, but also provides a common basis for managing
their own and shared marine resources. Furthermore, the Doctrine
calls for states to act as trustees, a principle codified in state constitutions and statutes. It is this trust principle that should guide the evolution of ROG in the Northeast and across the country.

